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INTRODUCTION

In his celebrated article, The Nature of the Firm, Ronald Coase explains the
existence and scope of the firm as reflecting a balance between the relative advantages of internal and external arrangements.' Internal to the firm, the entrepreneur
who coordinates and integrates activities avoids the transaction costs associated with
forming, adhering to, and enforcing external, formal contracts. Talented managers
can shift resources from one internal activity to another with relatively little friction.
On the other hand, external arrangements provide the entrepreneur with clear
messages, primarily in the form of prices. The entrepreneur who acquires supplies
from external sources has an easy time substituting among inputs according to the
relative prices of these supplies. The implicit costs of factors generated internally

The Class of 1962 Professor and Barron F. Black Research Professor, University of Virginia
School of Law. I am most grateful to Hideki Kanda, Glen Robinson, Roberta Romano, and Robert Scott
for comments on an earlier draft.
1. Ronald H. Cease, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937), reprinted in
RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33 (1988).
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are far more difficult to discern.2 It seems useful, for example, to think of entrepreneurs as regularly borrowing from one part of a firm to invest profitably in another
division. One external alternative is to borrow from a more formal creditor. This
alternative offers explicit interest rates (which enable the decision-maker to assess
the wisdom of the investment), but often comes with constraints and a variety of
transaction costs. In some sense, then, the picture is one of the firm as a planned
economy. As the size and scope of an operation increase, central planning is more
difficult and less efficient than market transactions because planners must develop
their own sources of information, while markets are animated by prices and other
signals. This insight, in which organizational size is seen as a function of competing
transaction-cost considerations, is rightly regarded as one of the most important
intellectual developments in economics, organizational theory, and law.5
This explanation of the size and scope of the firm is in the form of a deep,
suggestive framework. It can hardly be claimed that all internal arrangements are
more flexible and less informative than all external contracts. Thus, a labor-union
contract may curtail an entrepreneur's freedom to substitute one method of production for another, even while it makes the cost of labor quite plain. One might insist
that such a contract is external rather than internal, but it does not diminish
Coase's insight to note that some internal contracts are sufficiently explicit and
rigid, thus making internal growth no better than (and perhaps inferior to) external
arrangements. Conversely, some external contracts, such as relational contracts
calling for one party to supply as much of a given good as another requires at externally determined or profit-sharing prices, resemble internal arrangements in so
many ways that it seems pointless to insist that the internal-external dichotomy
explains all organizational decisions with a single theme. Contractual relations are
too rich for such a simple sketch. Nevertheless, the picture of a firm as something
with boundaries that represent a balance between transaction costs and valuable
information has proved to be worth several thousand words.
My primary goal in this Article is to enhance our understanding of the tradeoff
between internal and external arrangements with a new theme or variable. The
foundation of this theme is that there is a kind of ratcheting, or irreversibility, in the
evolution of a firm such that it is easier to expand than to contract. This asym2. This view of the firm is sometimes in tension with the equally modern view that a firm is merely
a set of contracts. The transaction-costs view emphasizes that not all agreements are created equal, and
internal arrangements may be more flexible and less costly to negotiate. Professor Coase himself has
emphasized not the tension but the consistency between these views. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature
of the Firm: Meaning, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 19, 28 (1988).
3. It is about law because law regulates both formal, external arrangements through contract law
and the like, and internal arrangements through such tools as labor law and tax enactments. In these
areas of law, it is therefore critical to understand the terms of substitution between internal and external
arrangements. The firm can escape from one tool of social control by externalizing arrangements that
were internal and, conversely, by internalizing or integrating activities that had been externalized. Determined lawmakers thus need to understand the nature of the firm in order to control its behavior.
Moreover, law itself generates transaction costs and it is important to understand that legal rules may be
(inefficiently) encouraging larger or smaller firms.

HeinOnline -- 18 J. Corp. L. 334 1992-1993

1993]

Irreversibility and the Law

metry4 draws attention to two distinct legal phenomena. First, in anticipation of
irreversibility, there may be precommitments-in the form of laws-against (seemingly optimal) internal growth. As we will see, law may offer a means of guarding
against growth that proves too great once irreversibility is taken into account. 5
Second, law may itself be the cause of irreversibility, because interest groups or
considerations of efficiency may generate legal rules that make contraction more
difficult than expansion. There is a tension between these two roles. One describes
law as part of a strategy for creating firms of optimum size, while the other depicts
law as an impediment to natural, efficient firms. Part II develops a more optimistic
story in which law can play a remarkably positive role.6 Part III begins with the
easier argument: Laws create transaction costs that in turn affect the nature and
scope of firms.7 The argument is not, however, a mere affirmation of Coase's theory,
because I introduce and emphasize the irreversibility problem. Moreover, I argue
that many transaction costs imposed by law do not affect the size of the firm, or the
internal-external tradeoff, because it is relative (inter-firm) transaction, or agency,
costs that matter in understanding the choice between internal growth and external
arrangements.' I suggest that this reinterpretation of The Nature of the Firm draws
attention to competition among firms with different ownership structures and agency
costs. 9 Moreover, it strengthens the case for the importance of the irreversibility
idea as a driving force in some areas of law. Finally, Part IV looks to other kinds of
organizations, including nations and eleemosynary entities for different examples of
irreversibility and its antidotes.10

4.

Economists are familiar with the problem or possibility of asymmetrically flexible, or "sticky,"

wages and prices, and there is some literature on a kind of stickiness in organizational growth and
formality. See Jeffrey D. Ford, The Occurrence of Structural Hysteresis in Declining Organizations,5
AcAD. MGMT. REV. 589 (1980). Irreversibility is too strong a word for this feature of organizational
evolution, because the basis for my argument is not that growth is really irreversible, but rather that it is
more costly to contract after internal growth than it is to sever external relationships. Still, I use the term
irreversibility, rather than asymmetry or ratchet effect or stickiness, because these other terms come with
the baggage of distinct phenomena.
The text discusses the interaction between law and "irreversibility," but it does not attempt to prove
that there is an "irreversibility problem." Moreover, the problem has several components, and skeptics
may quarrel with each. Thus, I assert in the next part that empire-building involves expanding one's work
force and building new facilities more than it does subcontracting with other firms. I also assume that the
tendency or taste for such internal expansion goes hand-in-hand with a distaste for contraction. Thus, the
"irreversibility problem" is the concern principals are likely to have about their agents, who by assumption (or experience) selfishly shape the firm's dimensions in an asymmetric fashion.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 11-14.
See infra text accompanying notes 11-43.

6.

7. See infra text accompanying notes 44-46.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 47-55.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 56-58.
10.

See infra text accompanying notes 59-67.
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IRREVERSIBILITY AND ITS LEGAL SOLUTION

Managerialism, Over-Expansion, and Preventive Measures

A familiar theme in the theory of firms and bureaucracies is that managers, if
left to their own devices, may prefer to build empires-to extend their control over
increasingly large budgets and activities, rather than to maximize profit, quality of
service, or some other good that their principals would prefer. In the case of government activities, there may be little else that is quantifiable for managers to
maximize (although there is the modern possibility that managers will try to maximize and advertise the budget cuts they can conceive and carry out). But in the case
of profit-oriented firms, it appears that it is either quite difficult to design appropriate incentive-compatible rewards for most managers, or that the market is slow
to develop such compensation patterns. Managers are widely thought to defend their
positions and compensation against outside acquirers who, in turn, are generally
thought to be controlled by other managers who seek larger empires for themselves.
This is hardly the place to examine either the evidence for these propositions, or the
problems principals face in designing and enforcing compensation schemes that
align their agents interests with their own.11 But it is useful to note that there is a
sense in which the nature of the firm itself causes the empire-building problem. To
the extent the size of the firm is limited because managerial flexibility and
command are eventually overwhelmed by the need for (external) explicit prices,
good managers will in part be those who can direct larger empires without explicit
external signals. Many managers will wish to appear to be good managers by
building large enterprises around themselves. If good managers are those who
command and control large organizations (within which their talents substitute for
explicit prices), then mediocre managers will generate a kind of "lemons problem"
by also constructing large organizations, or at least attempting to do so. Sole proprietors may have an incentive to balance internal flexibility and external signals in a
way that optimizes the size of their firms, but the nature of firms run by agents may
be to imitate the size and scope of firms run by the most valued entrepreneurs.
Competition and a harsh environment in which inefficient firms fail can surely
force managers away from selfish empire-building and toward transaction-costreducing steps. Nevertheless, one straightforward and perhaps superficial reaction to
the tradeoff put forth in The Nature of the Firm is to predict that, as a positive
matter, firms will tend on average to be somewhat larger than one would think by
simply balancing the transaction costs and information advantages associated with
external arrangements. This is because competition is unlikely to be so nearly
perfect as to eradicate completely the managerial preference for size. The point is
not simply to recall the familiar possibility of managerialism, or empire-building, as
opposed to profit maximization,1 ' but rather to see the very idea that optimal size
11. On the structuring of compensation, see Saul Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts in Agency
Arrangements: Lawyers, Real Estate Brokers, Underwriters, and Other Agents' Rewards, 36 J.L. &
ECON. (forthcoming 1993).
12. See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3437 (1980) (collecting various sources). There is also the possibility that managers pursue growth strate-
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and scope depend on managerial talent suggests that imitation of this ideal firm (by
more mediocre managers) may be an important determinant of firm size.
If we can accept the notion that many managers will push for increased size
and scope-for their own sake, because compensation is mechanically or even
partially linked to size, or because managers attempt to resemble good
managers-and that this preference may create a kind of stickiness, or irreversibility, because if things do not work out well for the enlarged firm, managers will
not be eager to contract the firm, then the scene is set for the crux of the argument.
The next step is to ask what principals, or even efficiency-minded social engineers,
would do to avoid the costs of empire-building and over-expansion. Knowing that
their agents will try to take the firm on a costly and perhaps irreversible path, what
can principals do in advance to prevent this possibility of inefficient internal overgrowth?
Before answering this question, it may be useful to note that there are complementary ways of expressing the likelihood of irreversibility. Perhaps the most
intuitive of these is to say that as a psychological matter, managers will find it easier
to hire workers and to open new plants than to close down operations, abandon
communities, and discharge workers who have become part of the family and
culture of the firm. An alternative version of the description leans more on selfimages than on interpersonal sensitivity; managers may see themselves as failures
both if they stand still and do not tackle new projects, and if they abandon a
project. Either way, it seems likely that there are tendencies in favor of internal
expansion, and that these are not matched by rewards for efficient contraction.
Moreover, the asymmetry seems universal enough to say something about under'lying human tendencies: Generals do not like to retreat; sports leagues often add,
but rarely drop, franchises; religions convert more quickly than they excommunicate; hospitals build and expand, but rarely sell buildings; nations invade and
explore for new property, but rarely offer independence or suggest partitions, unless
they are under great pressure to do so; and universities invest in new schools and
institutes and increase their student and faculty populations, but resist shrinking,
except perhaps in times of serious financial distress. It seems unlikely that in all
these cases the principals' goals (or social welfare) are consistent with frequent
expansion and extremely rare contraction.
One solution to this agency problem must be for the principals to make it difficult for their agents to expand. If principals know their agent has more of an
incentive to expand than they wish the agent had, and if they know that this overexpansion is costly because it is at least partly irreversible (if only because the agent
will resist contractions), then principals can try either to hold back from their agent
the power to expand the organization and tasks they have delegated, or try to establish mechanisms that resist expansion or encourage contraction. Equivalently, as the
principal-agent literature has shown, agents might themselves put such "bonding"
gies to achieve market power and monopoly advantages. I suggest below that the antitrust laws
themselves may have an ambiguous affect on the size of the firm. See infra note 46. In any event,
antitrust law is but tangentially related to the arguments in this Article.
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mechanisms in place to attract principals' capital at lower cost in the first place. 18
From the perspective of the nature and size of the firm, it seems plausible, if not
likely, that the superficial view is thus either wrong, or but one possibility. Firms
may be expected to be smaller than a pure transaction costs approach suggests,
because the fear of managerial tendencies and irreversibility will cause far-sighted
principals to encourage their firms to be smaller than first seems optimal. Knowing
that if their firm is too large it will be very difficult to contract it, principals may
prefer that the firm remain small. This is especially the case if exogenous events,
including business-cycle patterns and technological changes (affecting transaction
costs), make the optimal size of the firm rise and fall. It will be unwise to let the
firm (be it an automobile manufacturer, a law firm, or any other example that
comes quickly to mind) grow to meet new profitable opportunities if such growth
will lead to larger losses when circumstances change and contraction (to a point
behind the earlier launching point) is the profit-maximizing strategy.
My argument might stand here. It suggests that the balance set out by Coase
needs to be revised to reflect what I have called irreversibility. In particular, it is
likely that profitable firms that pool capital and, therefore, face agency problems
will substitute external arrangements (or no activity) for internal growth, because of
the extra costs imposed by irreversibility. These may be the costs of aggressive
monitoring, of forcing contractions on disinclined agents, of life as an inefficiently
large firm, or of some other obstacles to contraction discussed presently. Some of
these costs might be regarded as. examples of transaction costs, in which case
Coase's sketch might simply be expanded to include the transaction costs associated
with the stickiness I have described.
However, my aim in this Article is not only to complicate our perception of the
balance between internal and external arrangements, and the determinants of firm
size with the problem (or likelihood) of irreversibility, but also to explore the ways
in which law causes or mitigates this problem. I suspect that every reader can think
of ways in which law appears to raise the costs of contraction. I consider some
examples in Part III.14 But the more difficult and surely more provocative question
is: How might law reduce, rather than contribute to, irreversibility? My suggestion
is that law is capable of such a role, and that it indeed occasionally rises to this task.
It is also possible that collective action and other coordination problems have thus
far prevented law from playing a more important role in reducing the costs of irreversibility. The central idea insofar as corporate law is concerned is that
shareholders (or, more generally, principals) or agents seeking to bond themselves
can combat irreversibility by installing appropriate charter provisions, off-the-rack
default rules, or mandatory legislative rules. A variety of legislative and constitutional provisions, such as the Fifth Amendment's promise of compensation for
property taken for public use, or state provisions requiring balanced budgets or
limiting tax increases, can be understood as precommitments intended to force

13. The classic exposition is Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm.
Managerial Behavior. Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 44-46.
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better decision-making at a later time. Other legislation might anticipate the
problem of irreversibility and constrain agents' power to expand their organizations'
size and scope.
B. Mitigating the Irreversibility Problem
1. The Historical Example of the Ultra Vires Doctrine
One historical application of the theory suggested here concerns the rules
governing actions engaged in by a corporation that go beyond the powers given to
the corporation by its charter or the governing statute. A modern perspective of this
ultra vires problem is that limited powers (such as a statement in the articles of
incorporation that a corporation will engage in the railroad business, or a statutory
provision barring corporations from owning stock in other corporations) can be
understood either as a means of promising creditors that the firm will not engage in
risk alteration after the terms of borrowing are set, or as a way of controlling the
apparent authority of agents to engage in transactions that their principals would
wish to veto. Limitations on the powers of firms offered principals a means to
control managerialism. Agents may selfishly wish to expand the railway operations
they manage into different states and into vaguely complementary lines of business.
Principals can control such irreversible expansion by providing at the outset that the
purpose of the corporation is only to engage in railroad operations in State Z. It is
interesting to note that among the activities typically specified as beyond the powers
of corporations was the ownership of stock in another corporation.1 5 Such ownership
might have served to increase the reach of an agent's decision-making, and it could
be accomplished without the agent's intermediation by principals' choosing to
purchase stock in such other entities in direct fashion.
The ultra vires example is interesting only as a matter of theory and history.
Modern corporations are generally established to make money in whatever way
possible. Articles of incorporation reflect this general aim, as do the enabling state
corporation statutes. 6 The explanation for the disappearance of the monitoring
provided by the ultra vires idea is probably that it was too strong. Principals may
want to control their agents, but principals like to be ready and able to take advantage of profitable opportunities should they arise. Moreover, most creditors learn to
constrain the firm's activities managers with contractual tools that imitate what the
ultra vires doctrine had accomplished. 17 This explanation works as well for each of
the explanations of the old legal regime." The claim is simply that it is possible that
15. See generally ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 675 (1986).
16. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 3.01(a) (1984) (eliminating the need to state a corporate purpose). See generally JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & ROBERT C. MORIS, JR., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 216-18 (3d ed. 1989).
17. See infra text accompanying note 36.
18.

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE

LAW 102-03 (1991) (arguing that since one cannot tell in advance that a category of expenses, or
presumably of investments, is always antithetical to investors' interests, courts now leave questions previously decided under the ultra vires doctrine to markets).
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the law surrounding the setting forth of explicit and limited corporate purposes may
have served to combat irreversibility-and the disappearance of this law may simply
indicate that it was too costly a defensive weapon.
2.

Obstacles to CorporateExpansion

A more powerful and ageless example of the relationship between irreversibility
and the law, in which law may mitigate rather than exacerbate the problem,
concerns the constraints on various means of corporate expansion. One focal point of
this example is the asymmetry between acquisitions and divestments. If Corporation
X wishes to acquire Corporation Y, X will generally need to jump through a variety
of legal hoops to expand in this manner. For example, a merger or consolidation will
generally require separate votes of approval by the two corporations' boards of
directors and shareholders. 19 If, however, after some time, X's managers decide that
the acquisition of Y was unprofitable or otherwise unwise, X can sell off its Y division with no voting at all.2 0 This asymmetry provides the clearest example of the
positive relationship between law and irreversibility. We might say that because X's
managers are often too quick to pursue internal growth, their principals have established, or have invested under the protective umbrella provided by, institutions to
check such growth. More to the point, the psychological and financial implications
for managers from expansion are so different from those associated with contraction
that principals put much greater faith in managers' recommendations to contract. If
X's managers believe it wise to shed Y, X's principals may require no say in the
matter, because, inasmuch as the decision goes against the usual managerial tendencies, it is quite likely that the decision is in the principals' (and society's) interest.
There are, of course, other ways to acquire and dispose of new lines of business
or divisions. The theory suggested here becomes more appealing as other avenues of
expansion and contraction are accorded legal treatment consistent with the
dichotomy suggested above. X might engage in serious internal growth not by
merging with Y, but by pursuing a number of other options. These options include
the possibility that X issue new stock (and finance internal growth with the capital
that is raised through this issue), buy assets from Y or any other seller, make a
tender offer for Y's (or some other) stock, retain earnings and reinvest in X's
growth, issue bonds or other instruments to raise investment capital, or simply
borrow money from banks and other creditors. Most of these alternatives involve
obstacles or antidotes to irreversibility, as we might optimistically call them, that
are unmatched when comparable contractions are concerned. Sometimes expansion
and contraction decisions must overcome similar, that is symmetrical, legal obsta19. See, e.g., DEL.
§§ 11.01, 11.03 (1984).

CODE ANN. tit.

8, § 251 (1988);

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT

20. Generally, no statutory provision governs something less than a sale of "all or substantially all"
of a corporation's assets. Such sales may be approved by the corporation's board or an authorized officer

in the same manner as any other transaction. See, e.g.,

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT

§ 12.01

official cmt. 2 (1984). The point in the text does not, of course, depend on the previous (hypothetical)
acquisition of Y by X.
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cles, but it is virtually never easier to expand than to contract. The broad thesis is
that managers' lopsided inclinations to expand but not to contract are somewhat
balanced, if not remarkably balanced, by legal rules that, at least in the aggregate,
asymmetrically burden expansion more than contraction. A corporation with
authorized but unissued stock can normally sell the previously unissued stock after
overcoming the same obstacle, a vote of the board of directors, that must be met
when repurchasing outstanding stock (and therefore contracting) . But it is more
difficult to sell truly new stock. The articles of incorporation will need to be
amended through a shareholder vote, unless they originally authorized sufficient
shares for present intentions 22 and, in any event, the securities laws require more of
the issuer than of the repurchaser.2 1 Indeed, the very expense of complying with the
securities laws may be thought of as an antidote to irreversibility.
Similar asymmetries exist where X buys Y's assets, or.makes a tender offer for
Y's stock. Generally speaking, if Y is small compared to X, there are few hurdles
for X to overcome. This is as we would expect under any theory of these aspects of
corporate law, because X's principals will want to delegate every day decisions if
only to conserve transaction costs. But when Y is of substantial size, X's shareholders must vote their approval of an asset purchase, and, at a minimum, X will
24
need to make disclosures to Y if it makes a tender offer to Y's shareholders.
Again, one can hardly claim that these voting or disclosure requirements often
provide substantive relief for principals (of X) concerned about managerialism and
irreversibility. The idea is instead to think of these hurdles as costly, and, therefore,
as slowing down managers' inclinations. And the interesting thing of course is the
otherwise inexplicable asymmetry. There is virtually no legal hurdle to clear either
when X's managers are ready to sell off division Y, or when X's managers tire of
owning Y stock (acquired perhaps in a tender offer at an earlier date) and decide to
sell this stock.2 5 The conventional wisdom about these hurdles to large asset or stock

21.

See

HARRY

G.

HENN & JOHN

R.

ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS

282-83, 936-37 (3d ed.

1983).

22. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (1988).
23. The repurchase-new issue distinction follows from the 1933 Act's focus on the initial distribution of securities. Repurchases are of much less interest to the Securities and Exchange Commission
unless they are part of a "going private" transaction. It should be noted, however, that some legal
systems look much less favorably on-and even forbid-stock repurchases. I think it fair, however, to
explain such a posture not as an example of an attempt to discourage contraction, but rather as a means
of avoiding fiduciary breaches in the form of exploitative repurchases based on inside information.
24. The applicability of typical state law rules to mergers between entities of equal and unequal
size is discussed in CLARK, supra note 15, at 401-06, 414-18. Clark also provides an interesting comparison with tender offers. Id. at 546-54.
25. Tax law, however, discourages contractions of this kind. It is easier to satisfy the requirements
of an acquisitive tax-free reorganization than it is to meet those of a divisive reorganization. But this
asymmetry is conventionally (and correctly, I think) explained as aiming to prevent the bail-out of earnings and profits-that is, the escape of dividend taxation-through investment in a new division or
subsidiary. See HOWARD E. ABRAMS & RiCHARD L. DOERNBERG, FEDERAL CORPORATE TAXATION 1,
224-25 (2d ed. 1990).
A more sophisticated view of the tax treatment of divisions recognizes an asymmetry between the
treatment of acquisitions and divisions, or contractions, and sees a complicated relationship between this
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acquisitions is that shareholders are collectively experiencing a fundamental drastic
change. 6 But there is an equivalent change when a line of business is sold off, so
that the absence of voting and other rights in that context suggests that there is
something else at issue.
There is, it should be noted, the requirement of a shareholder vote when X
wants to sell "substantially all" its own assets.' 7 Similarly, the dissolution of X
requires a variety of formalities.' 8 In these cases of contraction, if they can be called
that, there is, however, something else at stake. Students of corporate law are
familiar with the conflict of interest that is often present when a target company's
managers are offered employment opportunities in an acquiring company. It is not
surprising when corporate law affords extra protections in situations in which a
combination may take place at something less than arm's length.29 Here, when a
corporation sells all its assets or dissolves (a procedure which often follows a
substantial sale), managers are not generally contracting the firm so much as they
are closing down an entity in what may be part of a transaction in which a new
entity takes over. In any event, managers do not continue to manage what has
become a smaller entity, and they may in fact control or be employed by the
acquiring or surviving entity. The irreversibility idea suggests only that (society at
large and) principals are relatively sanguine about managerial decisions that involve
shrinking the empires these managers control. When an empire is not contracted,
but rather sold off or reformulated, the irreversibility problem does not suggest a
lower level of monitoring; indeed, if one takes into account the danger of side deals
between acquirers and target managers, these may be appropriate occasions for
heightened scrutiny. The law regarding dissolutions and complete asset sales
appears to reflect this view.
We come now to the most interesting alternative means of expansion: debt and
the retention of earnings. I will not dwell on expansion through earnings retention
because there is a vast literature on this subject.3 0 From a tax perspective, it is
sometimes puzzling that corporations pay dividends, and in this way voluntarily
subscribe to the most raw form of two-tier taxation; the corporation has been taxed
asymmetry, or non-neutrality, and that between the treatment of incumbent managers and raiders. See
Paul B. Stephan III, Disaggregation and Subchapter C: Rethinking Corporate Tax Reform, 76 VA. L.
REV. 655 (1990).
ABRAMSs & DOERNBERG, supra note 25, at 403-04.
27. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (1988); MELYIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATION 255-62 (1976) (arguing that law should, but does not, provide for safeguards when
26.
THE

there is a sale of less than substantially all the assets in a transaction not in the ordinary course of
business).
28. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275 (1988).
29. A good example is the presence of the de facto merger doctrine, when managers of the target
company and of the acquiring company may have come together too closely. See Hideki Kanda & Saul
Levmore, The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L. REV. 429, 464 n.114
(1985) (linking case-law distinctions to presence of independent versus conflicted management, and
arguing that the appraisal remedy itself ought to, and sometimes does, do the same).
30. See, e.g., RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
51 (2d ed. 1984); WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 338-52 (4th ed. 1990).
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on its earnings, and shareholders are then taxed on the dividends they receive out of
1
the corporation's earnings and profits, with no corresponding corporate deduction.
Moreover, one would think that managers have every incentive to exaggerate the
profitability of future internal investments to justify the nonpayment of dividends,
the retention of earnings, and the internal growth of the firm. The most optimistic
thing to say is that firms choose instead to raise capital through the issue of debt
and preferred stock, and perhaps even to develop a culture in which dividends
"must" be paid, precisely to combat the irreversibility problem. Readers of the
corporate finance literature will recognize this possibility as a close relative of
Jensen's ingenious (and equally optimistic) cash-flow thesis, in which leveraged
buyouts are understood as a means of forcing managers to the edge when they must
32
produce enough revenue to pay debtholders and to survive. There is also something
•in common with Easterbrook's view that dividend payments force firms more often
to the capital markets, where the discipline imposed is valued by the shareholders
who receive (taxable) dividends.3 3 I would hardly suggest that these theories, modified or even improved a bit by the idea that the cost of paying dividends may be
partly offset by the value of the obstacle such distributions present to expansionminded managers, completely explain the famous puzzle of why firms pay dividends
at all. There are, after all, cheaper ways to contract. But I do suggest that the
absence of legal hurdles to the payment of dividends is not by itself counter-evidence
to the proposition that such hurdles are put up in disproportionate fashion in front
of expansionary (as opposed to contractionary) steps. Moreover, there is the
problem of identifying the proper starting point for evaluating the (absence of) legal
hurdles surrounding dividends. We might note, for example, that it is far easier for
the firm to pay dividends (to contract) than it is for the firm to assess its shareholders for new contributions (to expand). This asymmetry fits quite precisely the
idea of law as a solution to the irreversibility problem. It goes without saying,
however, that a better explanation for why we would not regularly expect or even
permit such "anti-dividends" (or forced contributions) is that they could be used to
put pressure on cash-poor or otherwise disinclined shareholders to exit from the
enterprise. Put differently, managers who wish to expand must either convince
shareholders to take a step such as issuing of new stock-so that a majority will
generally either have veto power over an expansion, or be protected by preemptive
rights"-or must convince external lenders of the wisdom of the expansion. It is to
31. I.R.C. §§ 11, 301 (1986).
32. See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989,
at 61; Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance,and Takeovers, 76 AM.
REV. PAPERS & PROC. 323 (1986). Note also that an optimist might say that government deficits
are good because they force the government to try to raise taxes and thus to argue for each new project.
ECON.

33.

Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. EcON. REv. 650

(1984).
34. I do not mean to imply that common-law preemptive rights are terribly important. The
simplest possibility is that if a majority of shareholders opposes an expansion, managers will be unable to
issue new stock (unless it has previously been authorized). But even when an issue requires only the
approval of the board of directors, it is possible that shareholders will object because of the proposed
price of the new issue, or because managers will increase their control through the issue, and courts may
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this external method of financing internal growth that I now turn.
When expansion is financed through a bond issue, the theme advanced here
could be said to carry on. The expansionary step will involve costs imposed by securities law, but the firm can always enter the after-market and purchase its own bonds
with no comparable hurdles to this form of contraction. The law can thus be said to
counteract, or at least to constrain, managers' inefficient (and expensive-to-reverse)
propensities by imposing greater hurdles to expansion. On the other hand, this is a
fairly weak asymmetry, because there is generally no requirement of shareholder
approval for the new bond issue itself. Managers can expand through this form of
leverage more easily than they can increase outstanding equity.
But there is no need to dwell on this form of expansion, because a more obvious
method for managers to avoid legal hurdles to expansion is to approach a commercial lender, who might quickly arrange a loan to the firm. Statutes constrain
dividends in the shadow of debt, and there are the now-familiar hurdles that must
be cleared to expand through mergers and the like, but statutes do not constrain
debt itself. The governing documents of a firm rarely place hurdles in the way of
managers obtaining loans on the firm's behalf. Balanced-budget amendments are
the concern of those who monitor political agents in state capitals rather than corporate agents in Wilmington and New York.
The key here is to return to Coase's central insight, and to revisit the link
between The Nature of the Firm and law as a solution to the irreversibility
problem. Internal growth and arrangements, it will be recalled, offer managerial
flexibility, while external contracts, in return for higher transaction costs, offer the
informational advantages of explicit prices. The irreversibility problem, in turn, is
that managers may selfishly substitute internal for external arrangements (or for no
growth at all). When the matter is put this way, it should become clear that, from
the shareholders' perspective, borrowing from a commercial lender is essentially an
external arrangement. The lender cares not for an agent's incentive or inclination to
expand, but rather about the likelihood that interest and principal will be paid."5 In
turn, the manager who wishes to expand must face the explicit price associated with
the interest rate on borrowed money, and this price offers the advantages Coase
associates with external arrangements. It is true that in the case of this external
arrangement, the empire-building manager can use the arrangement to sponsor
internal growth (so that the manager may not be much dissuaded by high prices for
credit any more than the managers would pause if acquisitive mergers seem expensive), but insofar as the irreversibility problem goes, the lender is a fairly good
monitor on behalf of shareholders. The bulk of the shareholders' concern must be
that their agents will expand the firm when the environment is profitable, but that

rescue these shareholders through some application of the doctrine of preemptive rights.
35. There is, of course, the problem that the lender's agents will build empires by loaning when
they should not. One response to this problem is that two sets of principals with agency problems may
provide more monitoring than one. Another response hints at the comparative agency cost perspective
that lies ahead. See infra text accompanying note 48. Creditors may be able to expand by lending to any
of a number of potential borrowers, so that competition among the borrowers helps the lender's principals, because the lender's agents will prefer to expand more rather than less profitably.
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they will be too slow or unwilling to contract when shrinking .is the profit-maximizing strategy. This tracks closely the concerns of creditors; debtors will enjoy the
upside return after paying fixed credit costs in cushy times, but will be unable to
make payments during downturns. In short, the most important method of expansion that is free of legal hurdles brings on a monitor whose concerns are remarkably
similar to shareholders' irreversibility fears."' The contractual conditions imposed by
this monitor are therefore likely to solve the irreversibility problem at least as well
as statutes and other precommitments solve the problem through the erection of
hurdles in the way of mergers, stock issues, and other expansive maneuvers.
3. Delaware's Anti-Takeover Statute
The preceding argument has suggested that the structure of corporate law,
which often erects higher hurdles in the way of mergers and other expansionary
steps than it does in the way of contractions or certain external arrangements,
supports the idea that law can anticipate and mitigate the irreversibility problem.
There are less systemic legal rules that might be similarly understood. Consider, for
7
example, Delaware's anti-takeover statute. It is a "moratorium statute," prohibiting "business combinations" with an "interested shareholder" for a three-year
period following the acquisition by any shareholder of more than fifteen percent of
8
the voting stock, unless the board of directors has pre-approved the acquisition.
The prohibition, or moratorium, does not apply if the acquirer buys more than
eighty-five percent of the stock (presumably because this larger acquisition leaves
fewer shares to receive less in a lower-priced second step, and therefore minimizes
the potential prisoners' dilemma problem faced by target shareholders), or if, subsequent to the acquisition, the board of directors and two-thirds of the other
shareholders approve the business combination." The interesting thing, however,
about the statute from the perspective of the irreversibility problem is that, unlike
other moratorium statutes, the prohibited business combinations include only those
between the target and the acquirer and its affiliates. Most prominently, the statute
does not affect an acquirer whose plan is to disassemble, or "bust up," a target and
distribute the proceeds to the remaining shareholders as a large-scale, dissolving
dividend. 40 As a matter of interest-group or interstate politics, this seems quite
surprising, because anti-takeover statutes are often understood as inefficient
attempts by managers and states to maintain what they enjoy; such a view suggests
41
that bust-ups would be at the top of the list of transactions to be stopped.
36. Similarly, we might say that the public issue of debt also offers a market check on expansion,
because of the explicit signals and costs in that market. Securities law constraints on public debt can be
seen as ensuring information for creditors, and also that the market's signals are meaningful and not the
product of some quick and misleading scheme.
37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988).
38. Some comparisons among the statutes are offered in CHOPER Fr AL., supra note 16, at 1094-

98.
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a) (1988).
40. See CHOPER F AL., supra note 16, at 1097.
41.

Many other business combinations leave the target in place so that managers continue in their
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In contrast, the irreversibility theme explains this apparent oddity quite neatly.
A free and well-functioning takeover market is thought, perhaps too hypothetically,
to discipline managers, because inferior managers will be displaced through the
takeover process. But to the extent that the problem is that managers selfishly overexpand their firms, it is something of a solution for better managers to take over the
firm-because better managers are, in Coase's terms, best matched with larger
internal organizations-but it seems far more likely that the efficient solution is to
contract the firm. Disassembly is thus the most powerful tool ex post, and even ex
ante it is likely to be an excellent threat to discourage over-expansion. The Delaware statute's remarkable exception for bust-ups can in this way be understood as a
terrific (and efficient) example of law as the provider of antidotes to the irreversibility problem.
It goes almost without saying that we had better not make too much of this
example. It seems unlikely that the Delaware moratorium statute as a whole is good
for shareholders and the takeover market, and only a strange evolutionary story
could therefore account for shareholders, managers, or public-regarding legislators
doing great damage with their broad brushes, but, meanwhile, cleverly precommiting in an efficient manner in one small piece of the larger devastating picture. It
is not an impossible story. The dominant forces and interest groups in Delaware
may have succeeded in drafting a statute that copied New York's more restrictive
moratorium-style anti-takeover statute, "2 and the irreversibility problem may have
caused a loosening of the statute exactly where we would most have wished it. But
many other states' statutes also make no exception for bust-ups, and given the
interest groups that appear to have captured the legislatures that pass these antitakeover statutes, it will hardly be surprising to find statutes putting the greatest
hurdles in the way of disassemblies. " In short, the Delaware statute offers an oddity
that may well be explained in the suggested manner. It is the broader argument,
however, comparing the relative hurdles in the way of merging of two companies,
casting off a division, and borrowing from a commercial lender (to expand) that
makes the positive case for law as a partial solution to the problem of over-expansion and irreversibility.

III.
A.

AGENCY COSTS AND LEGAL COSTS

Law as a Source of Transaction Costs and Irreversibility

The discussion in Part II suggested that law may be a means for principals and
agents, or for societies in general, to constrain the private incentive of agents to
positions, employees stay at their jobs, and (even) legal work continues to flow to the local law firms. But
bust-ups seem most likely to involve the end of these locally desirable goods. It should be noted, however,
that the statement in the text is also consistent with a view of state anti-takeover statutes that see the
legislature as "putting out fires," or responding to particular interest groups' immediate crises. See generally Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987);
Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987).
42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988).
43. See supra note 41.
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overexpand their firms. In turn, the basic structure of corporate law, or at least of
the rules governing organic corporate changes, suggests that this possibility may
form the core of a positive, descriptive theory. This set of examples, however, has
surely not taken too much away from the more familiar role law-and perhaps
especially law aimed at large businesses-plays as a preserver and protector of
expectations associated with the status quo. In this role, law sometimes constrains
expansion because growth threatens existing values and interest groups. It is far
more common, however, for law to protect interests by standing in the way of
contraction. Law can in this straightforward way be a cause of, rather than a solution to, irreversibility. When this is the case, the optimal size of the firm in a
dynamic setting is presumably smaller than that suggested by The Nature of the
Firm, because expansion can often be undone only at the substantial cost dictated
by protective legal rules.
It may be useful to restate this point to avoid confusing the legal rules referred
to presently with those discussed in the previous Part. The theme of Part II was thatsome legal rules can be seen as off-the-rack, even precommitment-style, solutions to
the irreversibility problem. Individual agents may tend to overexpand, but law may
counteract this tendency by making certain kinds of expansion more expensive than
contraction. There is, of course, the more intuitive idea that law protects vested
interests, or, more optimistically, investment and reliance interests. Consequently, in
44
this role, law may make contraction more expensive than expansion. The most
natural way to think of these conflicting roles is to think of the sources of law.
Pieces of corporate law, for example, can be seen as combatting irreversibility, while
plant-closing laws, for example, can be seen as causing the irreversibility problem.
In terms of the sources of these laws, shareholders and (precommitting or bonding)
managers may influence the substance of corporate law, while other interest groups
may bring about the enactment of such measures as plant-closing laws. Environmental and labor laws are influenced by still different interest groups. Positive
political theory in general, and the structure of legislative committees and other
institutions in particular, lead us to expect that given interests will gain in some
arenas even while experiencing setbacks in others. Much as heavy manufacturers
might, as an interest group, experience a mix of new environmental, tax, labor, and
tort laws in a given time period, such that it would be difficult to say whether in the
aggregate this group was better or worse off than before the new decrees, so too law
may at the same time, but with assorted provisions, generate and mitigate the irreversibility problem. And much as we would miss an important part of the story if
we ignored the interest that politically active manufacturers might have in lower
taxes and specific safety regulation, so too we would misunderstand other areas of
law if we did not consider the role of law as an obstacle to over-expansion.

44.

The protection of these costs can, of course, be efficiency enhancing. Thus, plant-closing laws

may force a firm to internalize the costs workers face in securing new employment. Workers will want to
begin searching and re-training before separation, and plant-closing laws encourage firms to give advance
notice (or to pay and internalize some of the costs of surprise). See Workers' Adjustment, Retraining and
Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (1988) (requiring certain large employers to provide 60 days advance
notice of intent to close a plant).
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The view just sketched assumes that there are at least some areas of law in
which rules make contractions more costly than expansions. This straightforward
asymmetry is familiar to most lawyers in the form of the sometimes ridiculed and
deconstructed, but always appreciated, distinctions in so many fields of private and
public law between action and inaction, regulatory constraints and subsidies, and so
forth. It is not only psychologically easier to hire than to fire, it is also legally easier
to convey good news and new jobs. The entrepreneur who hires new workers when
expanding faces some legal constraints that might conceivably discourage expansion
(and encourage external arrangements)-most notably, potential lawsuits by
persons passed over in the hiring process. But discharging workers as part of a
contraction runs far greater legal risks. Suits for wrongful discharge are far more
likely than those for wrongful non-hiring.' 5 Although there are many reasons for
this differential, we might simply note that the identity of persons injured by
discharge is much clearer than the identity of those injured when the "wrong"
persons are hired. This difference translates, as it does in many areas of law, into an
important variation in the likely success of suit.
Although there are many examples of this asymmetry (such that law causes
irreversibility), there are, of course, contrary examples, or even fields of law. A firm
that wishes to shut down a plant may face union difficulties, and even plant-closing
laws, but one suspects that these costs are overwhelmed by those tossed up by other
fields of law--or legislative committees responsive to other interests-in the face of
a firm that decides to open a new plant. Unless this expanding firm finds itself
wooed to an industrial park, or to some other location or line of business where
many regulatory hurdles have been cleared at the outset of development, there are
likely to be substantial transaction costs associated with zoning issues, building
permits, safety regulation, and environmental controls. Moreover, inasmuch as some
of these legal hurdles are best understood as supported by interests that fear business expansion, not (only) because of the fear that the plant costs imposed will be
inappropriately externalized and ignored, but because of a historical ideal glorifying
farms and corner stores rather than corporate headquarters and discount chains, it
is appropriate to think of these legal costs of expansion as comparable in some sense
to those that stand in the way of contraction. There is a sense in which all these
rules are enacted to preserve the status quo.
I do not mean or need to assess the precise magnitude of the legal obstacles to
contraction and to expansion. Indeed, there are areas of law, such as antitrust, in
which it is difficult to assess the net effect of even a single statute on firm size." 6 My
45. John J. Donohue, III & Peter Siegelman, The ChangingNature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 984 (1991).
46. Even when antitrust laws are taken very seriously so that internal growth is discouraged
because of the potential problem of size and monopolization claims, other aspects of these laws must
encourage internal growth by discouraging external arrangements--through the obstruction of vertical
restrictions, for example. I do not emphasize the role of antitrust law as an antidote to managerialism in
this Article also because of the ambiguous impact of this law on the irreversibility problem. There is
much in the law's origin and remedies to suggest that principals would prefer to do without the
constraints on their firms that this law imposes.
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argument is mostly about the positive interaction between law and the irreversibility
problem, because that is the face of law that I think has been unseen. My own
sense, however, is that there is not an insignificant "negative," or causal, interaction
between law and irreversibility, with law often preserving the status quo by blocking
contractions. If so, then legal rules may be a cause of irreversibility, and, in turn,
principals may wish to expand more slowly than intuition first suggests, because
they know that legal rules will make subsequent reversals expensive to accomplish.
If my sense of the legal landscape is controversial, and other observers guess that
environmental and other anti-growth regulation inhibit expansion so much more
than they do contraction that there is little need to think of law as the cause of
irreversibility, then little is lost in thinking that irreversibility is caused by managerial incentives and psychology.
B.

Reinterpreting The Nature of the Firm: Relative Agency Costs

The argument up to this point, and The Nature of the Firm itself, slides over
an opportunity-cost criticism that is usefully raised at this point. Coase (and the
discussion here) describes the firm as balancing internal flexibility-that is, relatively low (internal) transaction costs-with the advantages of signals from external
arrangements. The firm's size is thus a function of an internal calculation, or
optimization strategy. The analysis is of the standard microeconomic variety, in
which one firm's profit-maximizing decision-making is analyzed in a marginalist
way.
The problem with this view is best seen by considering a firm, X, that chooses
to externalize an arrangement, perhaps by contracting to purchase an input from an
external maker, Y, and perhaps for the reasons set forth by Coase. What about the
nature and size of this firm, Y? The arrangement that X has made external is now
internal to Y (or to some other firm that Y contracts with), so that the cost-benefit
calculation made by X in deciding whether to do something internally or externally
is now mirrored in Y. The transaction costs of internal growth cannot really be
avoided by X's deciding to externalize an arrangement, for they are now borne by Y
which, in turn, charges X for these costs (plus a premium, we might even presume)
as part of the contract price charged X. If the interesting question is how an
economy will be divided into firms-for example, when there will be several large
firms or many more smaller firms 47-then the answer must focus not on how a given
firm idealizes internal flexibility and external signals, but rather on how a given
firm's agency costs (or terms of tradeoff between internal flexibility and external
signals) compare with other firms' costs. It will be profitable for X to forsake
internal growth in favor of an external arrangement with Y if Y can absorb the
costs of growth more cheaply than X, or if X needs external signals more than Y (or
more than another firm that Y in turn contracts with in order to receive an external
signal itself). X will form an external arrangement with Y if these comparative
advantages are serious enough to warrant the transaction cost of the explicit X-Y

47.

As opposed to the question of when transaction costs will simply stifle growth.
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contract. Growth in the economy will be allocated among existing and new firms
based largely on their relative agency costs.
This relative-agency, or opportunity-cost, view of the nature of the firm reminds
us of the omnipresence of agency costs in understanding economic arrangements.
Managerialism and aggregate demand aside, firms will grow if they are able to do
so more cheaply than their competitors.' 8 This cost comparison is in large part a
question of efficient supervision and organization, or perhaps a function of specialization (in various monitoring tasks) by managers of different firms. X will
externalize its arrangements when other firms can produce things and transfer them
to X more cheaply than X can produce on its own. It is thus the relative agency
costs (plus a transaction cost) that separate X and Y. In turn, this opportunity-cost
view casts a different light on law as a cause of irreversibility.
Reconsider, for instance, plant-closing laws as an example of a legal rule which
may make contraction difficult, and, therefore, contribute to the irreversibility
problem. It should now be clear that this example is misleading. It is surely correct
to say that plant-closing laws make contraction more expensive, and might therefore
cause far-sighted investors to "underexpand" and the economy as a whole to suffer
(either because contraction is too expensive, or because there is resulting underinvestment). But if the aim of The Nature of the Firm is to understand the division
of economic activity among firms, and to understand the size and scope of individual
entities, then the question is whether a firm can really avoid the potential cost of a
plant-closing law by substituting an external arrangement for internal growth. In
the case of state law, the migration of activity to a less regulated jurisdiction is a
familiar possibility. However, in the case of federal law, why should the cost of the
law be any lower if one firm externalizes an arrangement, and thus shifts it to
another firm that is also subject to the law? The apparent conclusion is that such
costs do not on their own contribute to irreversibility, or to our earlier understanding
of the nature of the firm. If there is any microeconomic effect at all (that is something other than less contraction or, in the long run, investment in general), it is
probably the transfer of activities to firms that are either less likely to close plants
when this activity or others prove unprofitable (perhaps because they have diversified, profitable opportunities appropriate to a given plant) or unregulated by the
legislation, perhaps because they are too small to be covered by the
plant-closing
9
statute.4
This substitution effect may be of fairly general application. If, for example,
employment law contributes to irreversibility, because lawsuits brought under the
anti-discrimination statutes are more likely or of greater expected cost when firing
rather than hiring is involved, then activities may well be transferred to, or even
subdivided among, small firms with too few employees to be governed by these statutes.50 These avenues of escape suggest the rather obvious point that the size and
There is a hint of this in Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Influence, 4 J.L. ECON. &
33, 39 (1988), although the focus appears to be on other firms' operating costs, rather
than transaction, or agency costs.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (1989) (covering employers with 100 or more full-time employees).
50. Title VII, for example, applies to firms with more than 15 employees, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
48.

ORGANIZATION
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scope of the firm may have something to do with cost minimization in the shadow of
the law rather than with the sorts of considerations emphasized by Coase or in this
Article. Put more negatively, while it is easy to think of many laws that seem to
contribute to irreversibility by threatening to impose compliance and other costs on
firms that seek to withdraw from an activity or internal employment relationship,
when these costs would not be imposed on a firm that simply failed to renew a
contract with an outside supplier, virtually all of these laws apply just as well to the
outside supplier that our firm might turn to in lieu of internal growth. The costs of
these laws are avoided only by crossing jurisdictional boundaries, by generating less
activity in the first place (rather than by engaging in internal-external balancing),
or by substituting in favor of entities that are not subject to the laws either because
of their small size, not-for-profit status, or other special station. Moreover, such
substitutions-that is, potentially inefficient biases in favor of entities that are
untouched by, or otherwise favored by, law and regulators-are familiar, and hardly
require the framework offered by The Nature of the Firm or the irreversibility
idea." Put differently, much of law may be about the preservation of status quo
interests, but these laws and the political influences behind them tell us little about
the size and scope of a firm, because they generally apply not only to internal but
also, however indirectly, to external arrangements.
From the perspective of internal-external decisions, the most important
example of law's favoring the status quo may be the tax law's pattern of awaiting
recognition events before accounting for gains and losses. Tax law might be said to
contribute to irreversibility to the extent that a background rate of inflation, or the
law's own system for allowing depreciation expenses, causes most assets to appreciate in value over time, at least compared to their adjusted bases. 6 ' Tax law thus
discourages contraction, because the sale or other disposition of assets triggers gain
recognition. In contrast, the acquisition of assets often triggers no gain recognition
either because the acquisition is financed by internally retained earnings, in which
case distribution would trigger dividend taxation in the case of corporations or no
further recognition in the case of partnerships or similarly taxed entities, or because
the acquisition is accomplished by new debt or equity, in which case, again, the
structure of tax law generally favors the pooling of capital at least in the sense of
deferring recognition. 5

(1988), while the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 applies to those with at least 20
employees. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988).
51. It should be noted that Coase specifically allowed that firm size or existence would be a function of taxes and other government interventions. CoAsa, supra note 1, at 41.
52. In the period between acquisition and sale, many assets will have appreciated in value, perhaps
because of inflation. Other assets may have depreciated, but their business owners will have enjoyed
depreciation deductions, which in turn lower the "adjusted bases" of assets. Any excess of these deductions over real depreciation in market value as revealed at the time of sale is recaptured at the time of
sale. See I.R.C. §§ 167, 1016, 1245, 1250 (1992). And given generous depreciation schedules, many
assets will contain such potential tax liability (unless more than offset by the lemons problem in the used
goods market) even though the assets themselves have been part of a losing project. Contraction can in
this way be discouraged by tax law even when the assets are themselves unprofitable.
53.

See Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price of Incorporation, 77
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But this example of law asymmetrically favoring expansion over contraction
again says very little about the choice, be it for a given firm or for all firms, between
internal and external arrangements, except to say what every tax lawyer and
devotee of capital gains preferences knows: that once a firm has invested in
resources, it will hesitate to dispose of them to the extent that there is a tax bite
upon disposition. In the short run, and once assets are already in hand, X may be
locked in to the assets it possesses so that it may prefer to use these assets internally
rather than dispose of them and contract with Y. But this is nothing more than the
familiar lock-in effect of a tax system which awaits recognition events. In the longrun, this tax effect might either encourage X to expand, perhaps because the treatment of acquisition and depreciation is favorable in a way that is not easily
replicated by Y and passed on to X in the form of cheaper external prices, or
discourage X from investing internally, perhaps because the implicit taxation of
inflationary gain upon later disposition or contraction discourages X from expanding
or investing in the first place." But whether the net effect favors expansion or
contraction, the same effect must normally pertain to Y and to other firms. And to
the extent that firms may (for tax reasons) lease rather than purchase equipment,
both X and Y can turn to this substitute. More generally, short-term leases may be
a means of protecting against over-expansion, but X and Y face the same transaction costs in considering the price of this particular precommitment strategy. In
short, tax law may affect the decision as to the form of investment, and it may
affect the decision as to whether and when to sell or otherwise recognize gains or
losses. But it would seem to have relatively little to do with whether X carries out a
task through internal expansion, or by way of an external arrangement with (the
now larger) Y. What matters is the relative agency costs encountered in X versus
Y's expansion.
To be sure, tax law can be an important source of irreversibility (or of stimulus
to expansion), because the law often treats different entities in dissimilar fashion.
With the exceptions noted earlier, plant-closing laws generally treat X and Y the
same. But an operation may be profitably located in Y rather than X if, to cite a
few obvious examples, one is a corporation and the other a partnership or proprietorship (or the other way around), if one has net operating losses to use, or if one
has other sources of income against which to offset the early losses that might be
expected in the early phase of this new activity. Again, however, these differences
have long been familiar to lawyers. Rather than making the case for the analysis
proposed in The Nature of the Firm, or for that suggested by the irreversibility
theme, lawyers suggest that in most instances in which law is really a source of the
irreversibility problem or of the decision to enter into an external arrangement
rather than to pursue internal growth, we need to focus more on either the distorVA. L. REV. 211, 216 (1991).

54. Tax laws seem therefore to have a profound influence on a firm's mix of inputs, as capital and
labor (and different kinds of capital) are subject to different treatments. The impact of these differences
is not obvious; to the extent that labor costs are deductible as paid, for example, most of these payments
(unlike many payments to capital investors) are immediately taxed as ordinary income to recipients. The
effects of these laws are quite beyond the scope of this Article.
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tions or non-neutralities arising out of tax law, or the relative agency costs
encountered in the expansion of different firms. The balance a given firm's entrepreneur experiences between internal flexibility and external signals seems less
important than before.
This comparative cost reinterpretation of The Nature of the Firm does not, it
should be noted, detract from the positive interaction between law and the irreversibility problem explored in Part II. Principals will wish to offset the tendency of their
selfish agents to favor expansion and to resist profitable contraction. In this regard,
they may appreciate corporate law rules which place higher costs on expansion than
on contraction. The fact that Y's principals do this even as X's do is perfectly
consistent with the idea that X's managers will be biased in favor of internal growth
over external arrangements and, in turn, these managers' principals will favor obstacles to internal growth. It may be that the effect of all this is to generate external
arrangements involving firms with lower agency costs. This is as we should expect;
agency costs of various kinds encourage the emergence of sole proprietors, for
example, who have much less (and perhaps no) incentive to over-expand.55 The
picture is one of firms that expand both to take advantage of economies of scale
and, unfortunately, in response to managerial preferences. The firm's size is thus
related to real economies of scale, to uncontrolled managerialism, to tax rules (and
other factors), and to relative agency costs. Some entrepreneurs will simply be more
efficient managers than others, and perhaps we should understand the argument in
The Nature of the Firm simply to be that the more efficient the manager, the less
the need for external price signals.
C. Predicting Firm Size
The irreversibility problem, along with so many other varieties of agency costs,
can be avoided by minimizing the divergence of interests between principal and
agent. On the other hand, an economy consisting entirely of sole proprietorships
does not avoid agency costs, although we may label them differently, because these
costs simply reappear in the form of costs associated with external arrangements.
These external arrangements may also be costly to form (although they may provide
useful explicit price signals), but the point is that contracting parties will need to
monitor each other's performance much as entrepreneurs need to monitor their
employees and shareholders their agents. There may be a bit less to monitor externally, but when this occurs, it is generally because some of the transaction costs
have been pulled forward to the time surrounding the formation of contracts. Still, it
is interesting to note that at least the irreversibility problem is largely absent in a
world of sole proprietors.
More generally, closely held firms can be seen as representing a form of organi55. Note that there is some incentive even for sole proprietors to over-expand, because they too
may wish to imitate successful managers and expand their enterprises to appear attractive to potential
employees who may marvel at the size of the organization they have built up and controlled. Careful
readers of Coase will have noticed that he eludes some of these comparative agency-cost considerations
by writing in terms of a sole proprietor.
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zation that competes with that which generates publicly held firms. The former
economize on some agency costs, including those associated with the irreversibility
problem, and to the extent that closely held firms are smaller, they also enjoy more
external arrangements and explicit signals. Large publicly held firms, in contrast,
delegate more decision-making, suffer- far more substantial free-riding problems
because of their numerous and dispersed principals (and thus have more of an irreversibility problem, among other agency costs), and are likely to have proportionally
fewer external signals to guide the allocation of inputs. Offsetting these disadvantages is not only the transaction-cost saving associated with fewer external
arrangements, but also the "external" monitoring provided by public trading. A few
well-informed monitors, by trading for their own self-interest, keep managers, other
principals, and potential acquirers advised."
One natural question this description raises is whether we can predict the size
of firms or changes in the ratio of closely held to publicly traded firms. I do not
pursue this question here because it is too daunting an empirical project. Any theoretical insights we have can be easily swamped by tax laws, technological changes, 5
and demographic shifts, to name just a few variables that might encourage or
discourage the organization of activity into firms of a given size. Still, if over time
there were fewer small firms, one might surmise that the irreversibility
problem-among other agency problems-was not much of a problem. It is therefore interesting to note that the formation of new firms appears to have out-paced
the growth of gross domestic product. 8 I do not advance this single fact as any sort
of proof that over time firms not only externalize arrangements but do so in favor of
small firms so as to reduce agency costs. Nevertheless, if the data showed the
reverse it would give pause. More generally, it should be noted that the propositions
put forth in The Nature of the Firm are themselves virtually impossible to test.
What I have suggested is simply an extension to, or modification of, that way of
thinking.
IV.

THE. IRREVERSIBILITY PROBLEM IN OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

A.

Other Asymmetries

Although this is an occasion to focus on the nature of business firms, the irreversibility theme is at least as interesting in other contexts. In virtually all
56. Potential acquirers can, of course, take over the firm and subdivide it so that more explicit
signals are available to each segment. Such disassembly also resolves, temporarily, the over-expansion
problem.
57. It is not obvious, however, which technological changes increase or decrease the tendency to
internal growth over external arrangements. Lower transportation costs and facsimile machines, for
example, lower the costs associated with external contracts, but they must also lower a manager's costs in
monitoring such things as multiple plants.
58. For suggestive data, see U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 432, 532 (111 th ed. 1991) (growth in number of business establishments greatly exceeds growth
in the GNP). The enormous growth in the number of small firms is presumably correlated with the
statistic that would be of greatest interest-the number of formal external arrangements. These arrangements, it should also be noted, might be well correlated with the volume of litigation.
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organizations, we might expect agents to over-expand for a variety of self-serving
reasons, so that the question is whether bonding, monitoring, or other mechanisms
have been created to make expansion more difficult than contraction in the first
place. A number of the most dramatic agency and irreversibility problems should be
set aside at the outset, however, because on close inspection they do not resemble
the phenomena emphasized here. Consider, for example, the possibility that generals
thirst for victory and glory so that they attack and invade more quickly than is
optimal. Well-informed citizens, and certainly infantry, might prefer defensive positions and retreats (or even peace) more than their military officers, and there is
certainly a sense in which a failed attack is costly and thus irreversible. But because
there are also generals who have been thought too cautious, perhaps because they
perceived their self-interest as avoiding palpable setbacks, it seems most sensible to
think of this agency problem in its most obvious terms; agents may have different
risk preferences from their principals and this misalignment can be costly to principals. The jargon of irreversibility adds little to this more familiar perspective. Even
if it could be shown that there is more delegation of military authority to retreat
than to attack, the better explanation would seem to have more to do with the need
for quick decision-making than with a far-sighted solution to the irreversibility (or
risk-seeking) problem.
A better example is provided by the expansion and contraction of political
jurisdictions. It is tempting to say that leaders may have too strong an incentive to
push for growth during their terms."0 In the United States for example, the substantial hurdles to statehood offer a neat example of rules meant to offset agents' private
incentives. One problem with this view is that the hurdles to expansion are not
greater than the legal obstacles to contraction; it is even more difficult and perhaps
impossible for a state to secede. This comparison suggests that a better approach to
this area is to think of the hurdles to contraction as necessary to prevent exploitative
behavior by majorities threatening to expel members, and by minorities threatening
to abandon the Union.60 It is easy to think of arguments in favor of a regime that
simply does not permit secession. In turn, such a regime should be expected to place
serious hurdles in the way of new entrants."'

59. In the case of the United States, however, it is interesting that although we sometimes associate territorial acquisition with individuals, such as the Louisiana Purchase with Jefferson (and with
perfect foresight, among his other talents, he might have had too strong an incentive to recommend the
acquisition), we do not generally associate the incorporation of new states with individual agents.
60. Experimenting with expansion is especially sensible when it is easy to contract if the experiment proves unprofitable. Democracies, however, have reason to fear secession because of the problem of
coercion by minorities threatening such action. In turn, because "independence" movements are unpalatable or expensive, expansion in the first place can be very expensive. This irreversibility idea may help
explain the notion that democracies seem less inclined to war than despotic states. Not only must democracies be more responsive to their citizens, but also they may find it more difficult to avoid sharing
governing power and benefits with the "losers" (especially if these losers live in contiguous areas). Nondemocratic forms of government may find it easier to extract gains from new residents, and even to do so
on differentiated terms. In any event, firms may expand more readily than democracies (and perhaps
even other sovereigns) because they can dispose of parts later.
61. The argument in the text might also be made in terms of "exit" and "voice." Inasmuch as it is
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An obvious analogue is the relationship between the size of hurdles to marriage
and to divorce. Without expressing any view on the wisdom and morality of state or
religion-imposed constraints on these agreements, it is safe to say that it is not irrational for a system of social control to bar divorce, or at least to put enormous
hurdles in the path of most attempts to divorce. And once we imagine systems that
make divorce impossible, or nearly so, we can predict that cultural or other norms
may make entering into marriage a serious and even difficult proposition." This can
be seen as the converse of the irreversibility pattern described earlier. In the corporate context, rules raise the cost of that which agents are thought to overvalue,
namely expansion. In the family setting, "agents" may have a propensity to quit, or
contract selfishly, when things are difficult. The rules can thus be understood as
aiming to make contraction difficult, and there is the obvious resemblance to the
irreversibility theme.
Within each political jurisdiction, there is also irreversibility of the kind experienced by firms."3 It is more difficult for the government to abandon, or even to
privatize (and subsidize), activities than it is for the government to expand into
these roles. Ideally, a government's agents ought to be evaluated according to how
well they perform with the resources at their disposal. Even when citizens "exit" by
buying better security or schools in the private sector, it may be that the government is performing well. " But our tendency to ask such questions as whether a
locality has "good" schools or universities or playgrounds, as opposed to whether its
institutions do well with the resources at their disposal, surely contributes to the
kind of irreversibility caused by civil servants' own incentives to expand.
B.

The Irreversibility Theme in Non-Profit Organizations

In this article, I have concentrated on the irreversibility problem as it pertains
to the corporate firm and its close competitors. In this context, I suspect that
although many readers are skeptical of my optimistic view that law can be seen as
offering partial solutions to the problems of managerialism and over-expansion, few
readers disagree that there is a problem to be solved. There is enough in common
experience, and in the literature on defensive tactics, executive compensation, and
bureaucracies in support of this perception that an expression like "empire-building

easier to exit from a firm than from a nation, voice is more important in nations than in firms. In turn,
this may have an effect on optimum expansion.
. The expansion (by annexation, for instance) and contraction of political units within a nation offers
another example of the phenomena discussed in this Article. It is an example that I do not pursue except
to note that expansion (and contraction) need not face as much of a hurdle, because there is an external
monitor (such as the state, in the case of expansion by a municipality) in place.
62. Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking about Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9
(1990) (discussing premarital contracts and other precommitment strategies that vary with the ease of
divorce).
63. One might also describe decisions to delegate authority to administrative agencies as external
arrangements, at least as compared to the internal growth of legislative involvement.
64. Thus, a fast-food franchise and an expensive restaurant are not regarded as failures when
potential customers choose to patronize one rather than the other.
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corporate officer" requires no explanation. Indeed, no opposite term comes to mind,
because we do not think of many business agents as pathologically devoted to the
leanness of their domains.
It is possible, however, that we overestimate the problem of over-expansion and
underestimate the constraints and incentives offered by principals, the employment
market (which may value a record of cost-cutting more than it values the scope of
an applicant's previous responsibilities), capital markets (including securities
markets and commercial lenders), and the threat of takeovers. I have, to be sure,
neither direct evidence nor a means of testing the size of the irreversibility or overexpansion, problem, but there is a piece of what we might think of as negative or
comparative evidence. Voluntary corporate contractions (but not every day decisions
to substitute external arrangements for internal growth) may be more scarce than
voluntary expansions, but the comparison pales in the presence of the non-profit
sector. One can hardly locate examples of hospitals, universities, law schools, opera
companies, or museums voluntarily contracting. There are instances of universities
closing down departments or whole areas of instruction, but these are usually overwhelmed by roughly concurrent expansion on other fronts. Even when this is not the
case, the ratio of expansionary to contractionary initiatives must be far greater for
universities and most other not-for-profit organizations than it is for business organizations. It is difficult to name a law journal, law school, university, hospital, or
museum with fewer editors, students, beds, or works of art than were present several
years ago. Yet, surely there is reason to think that some of these organizationswould be better, however their goals are defined, or that the society they serve
would be better served, with some contraction. Put in terms of agency theory, few
such organizations seem to maximize average quality (which might maximize the
value of reputation or diplomas, for example). Yet, it seems likely that more specialization (as a result of some managers' limiting their scope to what they do best)
would sometimes be efficient and perhaps in the interest of principals, however they
be identified.
As already implied, one explanation for this apparently more serious irreversibility problem in the non-profit sector is simply the absence of any market check.
The expansionary instincts of managers of corporations are more controlled than
those of non-profits, the argument goes, because the former are monitored by stock
markets or, in the .case of closely held firms, self-interest (or self-interested coowners) .65
More interesting, perhaps, is the possibility that evolutionary mechanisms
provide greater controls in a way that is correlated with more serious irreversibility
problems. It may be true that the great universities contract less often than the

great corporations, but it is even more striking that the most successful universities
expand less than their profit-oriented counterparts. It is common to find modest
growth over time in student populations (even holding co-education and post-graduate trends aside) and in the number of fields of academic inquiry. But most
65.
skills.

Both sectors are monitored by lenders, customers, and employment markets for the managers'
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opportunities for expansion, including franchising, multi-state operations, and
tuition-revenue maximization are entirely avoided. There are explanations for this
pattern that are unrelated to the irreversibility thesis advanced in this Article. One
possibility is that managers and principals, be they alumni, students, taxpayers, or
past and present donors, have inclinations that are quite well aligned, so that there
is no agency problem to be solved. Both groups may seek to maximize status (such
as rankings or public perceptions of the elite) so that expansion is undertaken
cautiously and there is virtually nothing to be gained (on the part of agents, for
example) by maximizing revenue or franchising. In this regard, it is interesting to
note that while corporate managers' compensation is thought to be correlated with
the size of firms, 6" I know of no evidence suggesting that university presidents'
compensation or status is correlated with organizational size.67 This approach does
not, however, fully explain the failure of universities and similar organizations to
contract more often.
A more concrete, but slightly different, version of this argument is that one
aspect of the genius of the firm is that a successful firm's owners can capture the
value of what they have created by selling new- ownership interests in a way that
generates profit for the pre-existing owners. This is much more difficult for nonprofit organizations. A university that improves and innovates will have a difficult
time raising tuition in a way that benefits the previous generation of principals, if
only because its tax-exempt status forbids the distribution of profits to these principals, whoever they may be. In light of this inability to maximize profits, at least
from the perspective of individual donors or other principals, it is especially unsurprising that profitable expansions are not undertaken. The principals may have little
to gain and a great deal to lose.
In any event, I leave for another effort a more sustained inquiry into irreversibility in the non-business context. Such an inquiry will need to explore the impact of
tax exemptions, governmental monitors, and other features that distinguish the nonprofit sector. My aim here has been only to introduce the irreversibility idea, along
with the companion notion that law (and other arrangements) can mitigate this
agency problem. I think it is likely that the irreversibility problem is more serious in
the not-for-profit sector, and I think it is interesting that there are parallel solutions
in the form of cultural and grantor-initiated constraints on expansion, but my argument is meant to be more suggestive than insistent.

66. Data do suggest a role for profitability. See SCHERER, supra note 12, at 36-37. But the point in
the text is that while we expect the managers of the largest industrial corporations to be among the
highest in the nation, we do not look for a list of the largest universities in order to guess the managers
with the largest salaries in that sector.
67. Reputation does seem to be correlated with endowment size, but this connection may simply
restate the question of how and why certain kinds of expansion occur. For an interesting discussion (that
raises more questions than it resolves), see Henry Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?,
19 J. LEGAL STUD. 3 (1990).
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